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Distances involved in accessing basic services can 
constitute a major barrier to development. This 
paper analyzes the relationship between the distance 
separating households from microfinance institutions' 
offices in Niger, and the low levels of development and 
performance of the microfinance sector in the country. 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to understand access to finance for the poor. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
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To cope with the effects of geographical distance, 
microfinance institutions adapt their policies through 
more restrictive loan conditions, higher interest rates, 
and more intensive screening. The authors to discuss the 
tension between access and sustainability in the context 
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This paper explicitly investigates the impact that distance can have on the
development of micro￿nance institutions (MFIs) in Niger. Distance is de-
￿ned as the geographical space by road between households and the MFI￿ s
o¢ ce. Low population density might involve long distances for households
to cover in order to access facilities and services such as micro￿nance insti-
tutions, health centers, or schools. The intensity of this e⁄ect will be deter-
mined by factors such as the development of the country￿ s transportation
infrastructure and services, eventually a⁄ecting multiple aspects of house-
holds￿livelihoods.
Our study will focus on Niger, a landlocked country in the Sahara-Sahel
region of West Africa, with a vast surface of 1,267,000 square kilometers.
The country is a member of the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU), and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). In 2006, Niger￿ s population was estimated at 14.4 million. From
2000 to 2005, the population growth rate was 3.4%. In 2005, rural popula-
tion accounted for 83% of the total (United Nations, 2006). The country￿ s
GDP grew at a 6% rate during the period 2005-2007. However, it remains
one of the poorest nations in the world, with an average per capita income
estimated at US$280 in 2006 with 61% of the population living on less than
one dollar a day. The economy is led by the agricultural sector, which ac-
counted for 47% of GDP in 2006. The main economic activities are livestock,
mining (particularly uranium), and informal trade activities (World Bank,
2008). Social indicators are low, with a life expectancy at birth of 44 years,
an infant mortality rate of 81 per 1,000 live births, a literacy rate of 28.7
percent in 2005, and a gross primary school enrollment rate of 54 % in 2006
(United Nations, 2006). In 2007, Niger ranked 174th out of 177 countries ac-
cording to the United Nations Development Program￿ s Human Development
Index. In 2004, Niger obtained Highly Indebted Poor Country status (World
Bank, 2008). One of the main features of Niger is its population density.
In Table 1 we see that on average, the population density of 11 people per
square kilometer makes Niger one of the lowest-density ECOWAS countries.
Most of the population (90%) concentrates in the southern regions and the
northern part of the country consists of the TØnØrØ Desert. The region with
the lowest density is Agadez with 0.5 people per square kilometer; its terri-
tory essentially belongs to the Sahara desert. The region with the highest
population density is Maradi, with 40 people per square kilometer, which
remains a low ￿gure compared to other ECOWAS countries.
As we can see in Table 1, some important characteristics of the micro-
1￿nance sector in Niger are its low level of development compared to other
ECOWAS countries. With the lowest number of MFI o¢ ces, the MFIs￿
networks are less developed than in neighboring countries. With the sec-
ond highest rate of credit at risk per bene￿ciary, MFIs portfolios are also of
comparatively poor quality. When we look at the number of employees per
1,000 bene￿ciaries we nevertheless see that the sector employs a relatively
important labor force. With only one institution serving 26% of the clients,
mobilizing 14% of the deposits and granting 10.6% of the loans, we could
consider that the sector is fairly concentrated, even though Niger seems to
have the least concentrated rural-￿nance market of the ECOWAS countries
(SFD BCEAO, 2004). All WAEMU countries have the same legal framework
regarding ￿nancial institutions; Niger adopted it in 1996. At the national
level, the Ministry of Finance is in charge of its application and monitor-
ing. In 2004 there were in Niger 61 MFIs registered (SFD BCEAO, 2004).
The situation of the micro￿nance sector remains very fragile, with very low
￿nancial capacity MFIs and a contraction of donors￿funds (SFD BCEAO,
2004). Niger￿ s government has contributed to the dialogue of all the actors
in the sector, particularly through the adoption of a National Strategy of
Micro￿nance in 2001. The policy debate has focused on restructuring the
micro￿nance sector in order to improve sustainability (RØpublique du Niger,
2001).
Some organizations contend that distance may be an important factor
restraining access to ￿nance in some countries (Seep Network, 2006), and
even in the United States (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Some authors have
also pointed at low population density as a factor restraining micro￿nance
development. Paxton (1995) studies the similarities and di⁄erences in adapt-
ing the Grameen group-lending model in Burkina Faso, a methodology that
would permit higher outreach in sparsely populated areas. After di⁄erent
tests, it was determined that it was most convenient to work with women in
groups of ￿ve. Concentrating on female clients would target more disadvan-
taged groups, which are also less likely to migrate to neighbor countries and,
according to some MFI employees, entail lower transaction costs because
they accept rules and regulations more readily. Paxton (1995) describes
three group-dynamics mechanisms that in￿ uence repayment: coordination,
group solidarity, and peer pressure (ex-ante and ex-post). Coordination is-
sues yield multiple equilibria whereby a borrower￿ s incentives are to default
(resp. repay) as long as others default (resp. repay). Group solidarity relates
to the willingness of group members to pay for one of its members in case
of a shock (insurance). Finally, peer pressure would also favor repayment,
either ex-ante through selection of better co-borrowers, or ex-post to avoid
2interruption of credit access. Paxton (1995) concludes that ￿the provision
of micro￿nance services has proven to be quite costly in the Sahel. The
reasons are more related to the environment (low population density, poor
infrastructure, poverty, illiteracy) than to the methodology of group lending
itself.￿
However, there is a general lack of studies focusing on population density
and the costs associated with the distance that it may entail. Yet, the policy
debate is rather focused on restructuring the micro￿nance sector in order to
improve sustainability (RØpublique du Niger, 2001).
When considering an economic transaction between two agents -in our
case between a household, and individual or group of individuals and a mi-
cro￿nance institution- the e⁄ect of distance consists of the physical cost that
one of the agents or both need to pay in order to be able to realize the trade.
We analyze three models of credit markets: a complete information frame-
work, one with adverse selection and one with moral hazard. We assume
that distance a⁄ects credit market equilibria in several ways. First, there is
the direct transaction cost: the actual transportation cost to deliver ￿nancial
services to the borrower. We show that under competitive ￿nancial markets,
the costs are borne by the borrower in the form of more intense screening
of projects and borrowers and higher interest rates. A second implication
is an increase in monitoring costs: whether the lender needs to collect pre-
loan-approval information on the lender (adverse selection), or monitor the
borrower after the loan is made (moral hazard). Monitoring comes with
costs that at the margin can in￿ uence the decision whether to monitor or
not. This in turn translates into even stricter lending restrictions and higher
interest rates in equilibrium. Finally, we postulate that at larger distances,
the demand for credit changes as underlying charateristics (e.g. education)
are correlated with distance. Our selection models then predict patterns of
borrower and loan pro￿les that are the conjunction of MFI screening prac-
tices and the underlying spatial distribution of characteristics. In particular,
we ￿nd evidence that distance is also associated with higher interest rates,
lower loan amounts, but also lower frequencies of monitoring, lower default
rates and a higher prevalence of female group lending despite the fact that
female literacy is much lower than male literacy (the ratio of young liter-
ate females to males is 83% for individuals aged 15-24, World Bank, 2008).
We argue that these results are consistent with the view that (i) MFIs pass
transaction costs onto their clients in the form of higher interest rates and
more active screening, and (ii) credit markets are characterized by moral
hazard, with an agency cost that is decreasing with distance. We postulate
that an increasingly monopolistic power of MFIs acts as a disciplining device
3as reputation for creditworthiness is more important when there are fewer
alternative sources of credit.
We would like to acknowledge several shortcomings of our paper. First,
data quality has been a limitation in our study. The survey took place at
the peak of the 2005 famine, and availability and attention of households
have certainly a⁄ected the quality of the data collected. The high costs
related to transportation also limited the number of households that could
be visited. Second, in both theoretical and empirical discussions, we will
take the institution of group lending as given, and will not privilege one
speci￿c model of group lending. Thus, while the existence of group lending
is consistent with our theory, we will be agnostic about the relationship
between groups and geographic distance.
Our paper belongs to the literature of geography-based economic devel-
opment (see e.g. Fujita et al. 1999, Redding and Venables, 2002), and the
interplay between geographical isolation and development. However, micro-
econometric evidence is scarce. A large part of the literature dealing with
isolation and its relationship to economic development has discussed the
impact of infrastructure on access to public services and markets (see e.g.
Jacoby, 2000). By its descriptive nature, our paper relates to Fafchamps and
Wahba (2004) who look at the spatial distribution of child labor in Nepal.
Fafchamps and Moser (2003) also ￿nd that isolation is a source of weaker
law and enforcement. Our paper is thus an attempt to look at the e⁄ect of
geographic isolation on access to ￿nancial services. Finally, by testing credit
market models, our paper is close to Edelberg (2004) who looked at evidence
of adverse selection and moral hazard on the consumer loan market in the
US or to other e⁄orts to detect adverse selection in credit markets (see e.g.
Calem and Mester, 1995, and Ausubel, 1999).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces di⁄erent credit
market models to describe the potential mechanisms that would induce dis-
tance to a⁄ect micro￿nance development; Section 3 will present the data
and empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Testing credit market models
In this section, we present three di⁄erent models of the credit market: a com-
plete information model, and credit market models characterized by adverse
selection and moral hazard, respectively. We emphasize the behavior of the
equilibrium of the economy as geographical distance between borrowers and
lenders increases.
42.1 A model of credit markets with complete information
In this setting, there is complete information between lenders and borrowers.
We use the representative borrower to model group lending. Entrepreneurs
have no collateral and raise I units of capital from the micro￿nance insti-
tution - the lender. Borrowers are characterized by a vector ￿ of observable
attributes that include education, distance to the micro￿nance institution
and other relevant characteristics. The project cycle is as follows: at time
T = 0, a loan of size I is granted and invested. By construction, we as-
sume that returns to capital drop to zero above a given threshold ￿ I: At time
T = 1, the project is succesful with probability p￿ (￿) and yields R(￿)I (￿),
and fails with probability 1 ￿ p￿ (￿) with zero returns. The probability of
default on a loan is thus
￿ (￿) = 1 ￿ p￿ (￿):
Under complete information, the lender observes ￿ perfectly so that loans
can be made contingent on ￿. Under the condition that lenders break-even
in equilibrium, if r(￿) is the interest rate charged by lenders, credit supply
is given by
p￿ (￿)r(￿)R(￿) = 1
Borrowers choose the amount of loan to apply for in order to maximize their
surplus so that
I (￿) = argmax
I
p￿ (￿)R(￿)I ￿ I;
which yields
(1) I (￿) =
￿ ￿ I if p￿ (￿)R(￿) ￿ 1 > 0
0 otherwise
;





The step function behavior of the loan function I (￿) is essentially driven by
the constant-returns-to-scale technology. By allowing decreasing returns, re-
sults are qualitatively unaltered: loan amounts increase with ￿, while interest
rates decrease.
We now look at the determinants of the key parameter ￿. We suppose
that ￿ is a function of two salient parameters: the distance d that separates
the loan applicant to the micro￿nance o¢ ce, and a vector of characteristics
5e that includes the gender of the borrower, its education level, its sector
of activity, etc. Thus, we model ￿(d;e) with the structural assumptions
that @
@d￿ (￿)R(￿) < 0 and @
@e￿ (￿)R(￿) > 0. The implicit function theorem
implies that the marginal borrower de￿ned by p￿ (￿￿)R(￿￿) = 1 is such that
de￿
dd > 0 : due to the selection process stemming from (1), characteristics such
as education, ability to reimburse a loan are increasing as distance increases,
even though the relationship for the average borrower is going in the opposite
direction. To see this, let￿ s suppose that e measures say education and let￿ s
write the average education of all borrowers as
E [eje ￿ e￿ (d);d] =
Z 1
e￿(d)
e ￿ f (ejd)de;
where f (ejd) is the distribution of education levels at given distance d. For
any d0 > d, we have
(3)





















The ￿rst term in (3) is the intensive margin e⁄ect, which compares the
distributions of education levels as distance d increases. The second term
is the extensive margin e⁄ect, whereby the marginal borrower e￿ (d) is such
that e￿ (d) > e￿ (d0), provided that ￿0
d < 0 and ￿0
e > 0:
Proposition 1: Suppose the distribution of characteristics e to be such
that:
(i) [f (ejd) ￿ f (ejd0)] < 0 for every e and distances d < d0 :
Then intensive and extensive margin e⁄ects reinforce each other and for any
d0 > d;
E [eje ￿ e￿ (d);d] ￿ E
￿




(ii) [f (ejd) ￿ f (ejd0)] > 0 for every e and distances d < d0 :
Then intensive and extensive margin e⁄ects o⁄set each other and the net
e⁄ect is ambiguous.￿
We summarize the other results below:
6Proposition 2: Under the assumption that borrowers have access to
decreasing-returns-to-scale technology, the following holds in equilibrium:
(i) Loan amounts are non-increasing as distances increase: @I (￿)=@d ￿ 0.
(ii) The probability of default on a loan increases with distance: @￿ (￿)=@d >
0.
(iii) Interest rates charged to borrowers increase with distance: @r(￿)=@d >
0.
(iv) There is no scope for additional ex-ante or ex-post monitoring of the
borrower by the lender as contracts are complete.￿
2.2 Adverse selection in credit markets
We keep the same framework, i.e. borrowers are characterized by ￿(e;d) that
is observable by the lender. However, there are two types of borrowers: p or q
such that p > q and the probability of success of their investments is now re-
spectively p￿ (￿) and q￿ (￿). Types of borrowers are not directly observed by
the lender. However, the distribution of types is common knowledge, and we
denote ￿(￿) the probability a potential borrower is of type p. The literature
on joint liability (see e.g. Ghatak, 1999) has argued that joint liability could
be an institutional response to adverse selection in credit markets. Thus, if
adverse selection is more severe as distance increases, group lending is more
likely to be observed further away from micro￿nance o¢ ces. However, there
is no clear prediction on group size or group composition. Furthermore, we
assume that borrowers do not have su¢ cient funds to pledge as collateral,
so that no separation can take place between p and q borrowers. Alterna-
tively, lenders can decide to invest in a monitoring technology in order to
observe types with probability 1, but such technology has cost ￿ (￿)I (￿).
Monitoring will therefore take place if and only if
p￿ (￿)r(￿)R(￿)I (￿)￿￿ (￿)I (￿) ￿ ￿ (￿)[￿(￿)p + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))q]r(￿)R(￿)I (￿);
while lenders￿participation is given by
p￿ (￿)r(￿)R(￿)I (￿) ￿ ￿ (￿)I (￿) ￿ I (￿)
with monitoring and
￿ (￿)[￿(￿)p + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))q]r(￿)R(￿) ￿ 1
without. Then, supply of credit is equal to
I (￿) =
￿ ￿ I if supf￿ (￿)[￿(￿)p + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))q]R(￿);[p￿ (￿)R(￿) ￿ ￿ (￿)]g ￿ 1
0 otherwise
:
7Borrowers have expected probability of default
￿ (￿) = 1 ￿ s￿ (￿)
with s = p;q, and are charged interest rates
r(￿) =





[￿(￿)p + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))q]￿ (￿)R(￿)
otherwise. The implications are thus qualitatively similar to the complete
information framework as
@￿(:)
@d > 0: Adverse selection in e⁄ect imposes an
extra monitoring cost to the lender that is then passed onto the borrower via
higher interest rates and more stringent lending conditions. Loan applicants
(who include recipients and those who were denied credit) will be visited by
a lender prior to the loan decision with a likelihood that depends on the
relative cost ￿ (￿) with respect to the ￿need￿for screening ￿(￿). Without
further structural assumptions on these functions, the patterns of pre-loan
visits are uncertain. However, conditional on receiving a loan, all individuals
are equally likely to be monitored by the lender. We summarize the results
below:
Proposition 3: If credit markets are characterized by adverse selection:
(i) Properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, and properties (i)-(iii) of Propo-
sition 2 still hold.
(ii) Group lending is more likely to be observed at larger distances from
micro￿nance o¢ ces.
(iii) Lenders undertake monitoring visits prior to the loan decision. The
probability of visits is identical conditional on being a borrower; in particu-
lar, it does not depend on d.￿
2.3 Moral hazard in credit markets
Let￿ s modify the complete-information model and add a T = 1 e⁄ort stage,
in which the borrower has the option to exert e⁄ort. If the borrower ex-
erts e⁄ort, then the probability of success is p￿ (￿) but the borrower does
not enjoy any private bene￿t. Otherwise, the borrower gets private bene￿t
B (￿)I (￿) but the probability of success drops down to q￿ (￿), with q < p:
8E⁄ort is not contractible, but the lender can spend an amount ￿ (￿)I (￿) in
monitoring costs to bring the borrower￿ s private bene￿t down to 0: Borrow-
ers￿incentive-compatibility constraints are given by
(4) r(￿) ￿ 1 ￿
￿ (￿)
(p ￿ q)￿ (￿)R(￿)
where ￿ (￿) 2 f0;B (￿)g: The lender will exercise monitoring of the borrower
if and only if




Assuming that monitoring costs increase with distance, monitoring is less
likely to occur at further distances if [B (￿) ￿ b(￿)] is non-increasing as dis-
tance increases. Then, the lender will make a loan decision as follows:
I (￿) =
(








Furthermore, the literature on group lending also argues that group lending
could be a response to moral hazard when group monitoring is more e¢ cient
than individual monitoring. However, how group size will change as distance
increases is uncertain as the tension between free-riding and insurance is
unlikely to be systematically correlated with distance from MFIs￿o¢ ces.
Proposition 4: If credit markets are characterized by moral hazard:
(i) Properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, and properties (i), (ii) and (iv)
of Proposition 2 still hold
(ii) Group lending is more likely to be observed at larger distances from
micro￿nance o¢ ces
(iii) If the informational rent (measured by private bene￿t B (￿)) is non-
decreasing with distance, then interest rates r(￿) should decrease: @r(￿)=@d <
0
(iv) If the informational rent (measured by private bene￿t B (￿)) is non-
increasing with distance, then the probability of monitoring decreases with
distance.￿
3 Empirical results
In this section, we will test the predictions of the three stylized models
analyzed previously. We summarize the main implications of the models:
91. The intensity of screening increases with distance: at the margin, bor-
rower characteristics should improve as distance increases, while the
predictions for the average borrower are ambiguous.
2. A pre-loan visit by MFI o¢ cials is evidence of adverse selection: across
borrowers the probability of a pre-loan visit is independent of distance.
3. Post-loan monitoring visits by MFI o¢ cials are evidence of moral haz-
ard: ceteris paribus, monitoring is less likely to occur as distance in-
creases.
4. In the moral hazard context:
If the informational rent is nondecreasing with distance: rates of de-
fault increase with distance, while predictions on monitoring and in-
terest rates are ambiguous.
If the informational rent is nonincreasing with distance: monitoring de-
creases with distance and interest rates increase with distance, while
predictions on default are ambiguous.
3.1 Data
Data were collected in July 2005. The speci￿city of the data is that they
both include information on the MFI￿ s side, and the socio-economic infor-
mation on clients: this approach allows to record information on clients￿
assets, education, and household composition, which are not collected by
the MFI. The questionnaire was also especially designed to look at the issue
of distance.
The population of reference consists of MFI￿ s clients in 5 of the 7 re-
gions of Niger. Among the 59 MFIs with an authorization of the Ministry
of Finance to o⁄er micro￿nance services (BCEAO, 2002), 10 were chosen
based on availability and regional location. Moreover, as the focus of the
present study was the investigation of the impact of distance on MFI perfor-
mance, sampling of borrowers has been strati￿ed by distance. Each sampled
MFI branch was asked to sample clients by stratum. Of all the applications
received by these 10 MFIs in the last 5 years, 191 loan applications were
selected as survey sample. Those applications were requested according to
di⁄erent distance ranges to individuals and groups. Subsequently, a group
and household questionnaire would be administered according to the infor-
mation provided by the MFI to locate its clients. The ￿nal sample consists
of 161 clients who have had a ￿nancial relationship with 10 MFIs. Statisti-
cal weights were applied at the 3 levels of strati￿cation: di⁄erent regions of
10the country, di⁄erent sizes of MFI and di⁄erent distribution of each MFI￿ s
clients. The ￿rst weight accounts for the number of MFIs operating in a re-
gion. The second addresses di⁄erences in size between the MFIs, and ￿nally
the third weight corrects the selection of households in di⁄erent distance
ranges.1
Table 2 summarizes the main socio-economic variables for these individ-
uals for di⁄erent types of clients: as we can see, borrowers are around 50
years old and those in rural areas have lower household income per capita.
On average, families are more numerous in urban contexts.
Our analysis will restrict to group lending, as individual lending is found
to be mostly restricted to urban areas, in the vincinity of micro￿nance o¢ ces.
The methodology we will follow consists of comparing groups characteristics,
contractual forms, monitoring activities and outcomes as distance between
clients and the MFI increases.
3.2 Regression results
The canonical regression analysis consists of the following
Yi = ￿ + ￿ ￿ disti + Xi￿ + "i
where Yi is the outcome of interest, disti is the distance that separates
borrowers from the MFI￿ s o¢ ce, and Xi is a vector of group characteristics.
Observations are weighted to account for our sampling strategy, and our
regressions account for heteroskedasticity.
3.2.1 Group characteristics
First and foremost, groups are more likely to be found at larger distances
(Table 1). While no individual lending is observed when the distance ex-
ceeds 25 kilometers, group lending takes place as far as 230 kilometres from
the MFI￿ s o¢ ces. A complete information framework cannot explain the
emergence of joint liability. We interpret the dominance of group lending
as evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard that are more expensive to
address as distance increases. However, there is no clearcut prediction on
the relationship between group size and distance, and no empirical pattern
emerges either (results not shown).
1The computation of the weight to be applied for group i is thus given by expression:
TotalWeighti = RegionMFIweighti ￿ MFIsizeweighti ￿ Distancei
11Table 3 looks at average group characteristics. In terms of our model,
we are interested in looking at the behavior of E [eje ￿ e￿ (d);d], as d in-
creases, where e is a vector of group characteristics that are believed to be
relevant for creditworthiness. Proposition 1 predicts that if E [ejd] is non-
decreasing with e, then if selection actually takes place, we should observe
@
@dE [eje ￿ e￿ (d);d] > 0:
Looking at gender, women in Niger are associated with higher creditwor-
thiness, anecdotically because the stigma of default is more severe on them.
In Paxton￿ s terms we could say that women are more vulnerable to peer
pressure. Furthermore, we do not expect to see the demand for credit to
exhibit a gender gradient with distance, thus Proposition 1 predicts a higher
likelihood that borrowers are female groups as distance increases. This pre-
diction is supported by the positive correlation between group gender and
distance displayed in Table 3, column (1). The coe¢ cient can be interpreted
as follows: a group of borrowers at a 100 kilometer distance from the MFI
center is 40 percent more likely to be a female group than the average group
of borrowers at a 10 kilometer distance.
On the other hand, if e measures education, we expect @
@dE [ejd] < 0 :
average education levels in the population decreases as we move further away
from urban centers, where MFI o¢ ces usually are. Thus, intensive margin
and extensive margin e⁄ects give ambiguous results in terms of education
levels of the average borrower. This fact is consistent with the absence of
signi￿cant relationship between education and distance (Table 3, columns
(2) to (7)).
Finally, if we look at the sector of activity of the average borrower, cash
generating activities are safer investments from a lender￿ s standpoint. Thus,
similarly to groups￿gender, Proposition 1,3 and 4 all predict a bias of lending
activities towards short term projects as distance increases. Columns (8) to
(10) in Table 3 show a positive correlation between distance and the fact
that the loan was primarily used to ￿nance short-term trading activities.
3.2.2 Loan characteristics
We now turn to the determinants of the ￿nancial contract. in Table 4,
columns (1) to (4) display the determinants of loan amounts, whether it
is the reported amount that was applied for (columns (1) and (2)), or the
amount granted (columns (3) and (4)). First, we remark that higher ed-
ucation of the head of the group is associated with larger loans. Second,
as distance increases, the amount of loan granted decreases. This result is
consistent with the three proposed models of credit markets provided that
12projects have decreasing net present value as distance increases.
Columns (5) to (7) suggest that while pre-loan visits are common, their
frequency is independent of the distance that separates the borrower from
the lender. These results are consistent with the adverse selection case and
Proposition 3, whereby all loan recipients should have equal probability of
a visit, irrespectively of their distance.
Finally, if we look at interest rates charged, we ￿nd a strongly positive
and statistically signi￿cant relationship with distance. This result is con-
sistent with Proposition 2 and 3, whereby interest rates internalize the net
present value of the project. In the moral hazard case, Proposition 4 sug-
gests that the only possibility for interest rates to increase with distance
while net present values are decreasing, is that the information asymmetry
B (￿) must decrease with distance. This is a plausible explanation if one
assumes that B (￿) captures the outside option of the borrower in case of
failure. When borrowers are further away, it is likely that reputation is more
important as there is no alternative credit institution to turn to in case of
default. Thus, if B (￿) decreases with distance d su¢ ciently rapidly, then (4)
can yield a negative gradient betwen interest rates and geographic distance.
3.2.3 Loan performance
Table 5 con￿rms the presumption that B (￿) does not increase as d becomes
large: columns (1) to (3) show that borrower monitoring is less likely as
necessary traveled distances increase. This suggests that the bene￿ts from
monitoring (B (d) ￿ b(d)) do not increase as fast as monitoring costs ￿ (d).
Yet, columns (4) to (11) in Table 5 suggest that in the absence of monitoring,
repayment is still improved as distances increase. Thus, in an economy in
which monitoring is taking place, for lower monitoring frequencies to be
associated with higher repayment rates, it must be the case that information
asymmetry is less severe as monitoring costs increase.
We postulate that a rationale underlying decreasing moral hazard has to
do with the increasing importance of reputation among borrowers: a default
might be sanctioned by loan denial in the future as there are few ￿nan-
cial institutions far away from urban centers. Thus, since clients have less
possibilities of getting access to ￿nance, travel costs usually put MFIs in
a situation of de facto monopoly power, that in turn acts as a monitoring
device.
134 Conclusion
We started the paper with the presumption that distance would impose a
cost on micro￿nance development. However, how the cost would be trans-
mitted to borrowers was an open question. The analysis conducted here
suggests that the cost is born in part by borrowers who face higher interest
rates, and more constraints and delays to obtain a loan, but is certainly also
faced by marginal borrowers who are then excluded from the semi-formal
credit market. The marginal borrower is moving higher up in the income
distribution as distance increases. Moreover, we argue that adverse selection
and moral hazard also plague the credit market, increasing transaction costs.
Finally, we speculate that distance is also associated with the rarity of mi-
cro￿nance institutions, putting providers of ￿nance in a monopoly situation
that acts as a monitoring tool for borrowers: reputation of creditworthiness
is more important to preserve as distance increases.
We do not make any normative statement on whether the micro￿nance
sector is developed enough or not. The results shown in this paper bring
back the tension that exists between outreach and ￿nancial sustainability. If
micro￿nance institutions need to be sustainable, they need to manage their
portfolio carefully. Distance will de facto impose a risk on their portfolio,
so that they will need to screen the demand for ￿nance accordingly. There
is therefore an intrinsic contradiction between outreach and sustainability
that is exacerbated by low population density, making distance an important
parameter in this tradeo⁄.
Our ￿ndings also suggest that limiting outreach has important conse-
quences, as distant clients are more likely to be traders, while producers
(especially breeders) are more likely to be left out of the credit market. Be-
yond the e¢ ciency concern, we also raise the equity concern whereby the
poorest of the poor might be more likely to be excluded as they live further
away from economic centers, and are engaged in activities that would not be
considered creditworthy for MFIs. Screening policies implemented by MFIs
to maintain the quality of their portfolios will potentially hurt the poor (see
also Paxton and Fruman, 1997). The tradeo⁄ between sustainability and
outreach therefore deserves more attention in academic research and policy
discussions.
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16Table 1: Population density* and microfinance development** indicators
Indicator Benin Burkina Faso  Cote d’Ivoire  Mali  Niger  Senegal Togo 
Density population (People / km²) 77 50 57 11 11 61 111
Institutions 79 41 21 93 61 290 59
MFI offices 449 425 220 858 170 721 203
Clients 690,428 742,618 575,050 656,092 94,096 777,379 299,674
Deposits (Million FCFA) 39,240 34,988 46,651 26,511 3, 856 55,326 20,262
Outstanding loans (Million FCFA) 59,678 29,466 19,337 34,142 4,380 67,906 16,997
Risky credits (Million FCFA) 1,436 1,705 1,024 2,037 415 2,442 1,748
Net result (Million FCFA) 3, 536 532 -1,123 895 35 4,389 -703
Outstanding loans / Population (FCFA) 8,309 2,301 1,082 2,799 360 5,964 2,839
Deposits / Population (FCFA) 5,464 2,732 2,610 2,173 317 4,859 3,384
Clients/ Population (Ratio) 0.096 0.058 0.032 0.054 0.008 0.068 0.05
Outstanding loans / Clients (FCFA) 86,436 39,679 33,627 52,038 46,548 87,353 56,718
Deposits / Clients (FCFA) 56,834 47,114 81,125 40,407 40,979 71,170 67,613
Risky credit/ Clients (FCFA) 2,080 2,296 1,781 3,105 4,410 3,141 5,833
MFI offices/ 100 Clients (Ratio) 0.65 0.57 0.38 1.31 1.81 0.93 0.68
Employees / 1,000 Clients (Ratio) 2.26 2.76 1.46 3.92 3.59 2.47 3.13
* Source: UN, 2006
** Source: SFD BCEAO 2003 & 2004Table 2. Summary indicators
Group clients Individual clients Difference Robust
Variable Avrg. Std Dv. Min Max Obs Avrg. Std Dv. Min Max Obs Standard error
Distance (km) 107.900 65.942 0 230 78 1.540 3.198 0 25 83 106.3*** 14.330
Age (number) 51.445 11.781 24 80 68 45.638 9.913 27 88 78 5.8* 2.948
Sex female (%) 0.987 0.113 0 1 75 0.187 0.392 0 1 83 0.000 0.000
Children (number) 5.739 2.041 0 19 66 7.801 4.498 0 21 82 -2.1** 0.836
Household income (thousand FCFA) 19.243 49.244 0 316,000 59 111.066 99.715 15,000 455,000 66 -91.82*** 23.720
Household income per person (thousand FCFA) 2.017 4.236 0 30,000 55 11.374 10.443 1,785.7 54,800.0 64 -9.4*** 2.310
Occupation commerce (%) 0.645 0.482 0 1 78 0.082 0.276 0 1 83 0.563*** 0.125
Occupation breeding (%) 0.059 0.237 0 1 78 0.000 0.000 0 0 83 0.059 0.043
Occupation agriculture (%) 0.099 0.301 0 1 78 0.017 0.130 0 1 83 0.082 0.051
Occupation handicraft (%) 0.001 0.026 0 1 78 0.051 0.222 0 1 83 -0.051 0.050
Object of loan commerce (%) 0.653 0.479 0 1 78 0.412 0.495 0 1 83 0.241 0.156
Object of loan breeding (%) 0.127 0.335 0 1 78 0.027 0.163 0 1 83 0.100 0.090
Object of loan agriculture (%) 0.376 0.488 0 1 78 0.151 0.360 0 1 83 0.23* 0.136
Object of loan handicraft (%) 0.002 0.044 0 1 78 0.000 0.000 0 0 83 0.002 0.001
Object of loan education (%) 0.000 0.000 0 0 78 0.111 0.317 0 1 83 -0.111 0.068
Object of loan social events (%) 0.000 0.000 0 0 78 0.130 0.338 0 1 83 -0.130* 0.068
Object of loan housing 0.000 0.000 0 0 78 0.094 0.294 0 1 83 -0.094* 0.052
Amount applied for (thousand FCFA) 755.346 650.470 100,000 11,085,000 77 225.227 348.436 10,000 2,400,000 83 530.12*** 85.740
Amount applied for, per group member (thousand FCFA) 57.623 30.579 6,383 363,636 73 225.227 348.436 10,000 2,400,000 83 -167.60*** 43.320
Amount applied for, per beneficiary (thousand FCFA) 58.756 33.416 6,383 318,182 63 225.227 348.436 10,000 2,400,000 83 -166.47*** 43.370
Amount granted (thousand FCFA) 705.258 668.290 100,000 9,000,000 75 219.204 294.057 9,000 1,700,000 81 486.05*** 79.840
Amount granted, per group member (thousand FCFA) 50.693 27.852 6,250 545,455 71 219.204 294.057 9,000 1,700,000 81 -168.51*** 36.640
Amount granted, per beneficiary (thousand FCFA) 51.403 30.821 6,250 318,182 61 219.204 294.057 9,000 1,700,000 81 -167.80*** 36.690
Interest rate (%) 2.797 0.435 1 3.125 30 2.495 0.052 2 2.5 64 0.303 0.192
Visited by officer before granting loan (%) 0.994 0.078 0 1 69 0.510 0.503 0 1 81 0.49*** 0.091
Processing time (days) 30.361 54.984 1 356 76 12.176 5.358 3 30 80 18.2** 8.264
Frequency of reimbursement (months) 5.898 0.751 1 12 77 1.408 1.538 1 12 67 4.5*** 0.209
Defaulted on loan (%) 0.878 0.331 0 1 47 0.664 0.477 0 1 52 0.214* 0.120
Delay in reimbursement (days) 1,034.820 801.233 2 1,770 29 58.956 47.738 1 390 31 975*** 229.636
Group members (number) 15.069 10.544 7 130 74 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Number of beneficiaries in group (number) 14.527 9.654 5 50 64 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 3: Linear regression of the determinants of group characteristics
Dependent variables
Female group Attended school (1:yes,0:no) Years of education Purpose of loan trade (1:yes,0:no)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Logarithm of distance 0.038*** -0.045 -0.041 0.046 -0.047 0.040 0.707 0.358*** 0.375*** 0.083
[0.014] [0.047] [0.049] [0.098] [0.803] [0.833] [1.004] [0.127] [0.133] [0.166]
Female group (1:yes,0:no) -0.108 0.149 -2.683 -0.609 -0.528 -1.442
[0.197] [0.295] [2.775] [3.927] [0.375] [0.911]
Interaction distance and group gender dummy variable -0.090 -0.686 0.296
[0.110] [1.324] [0.285]
Education of head of group (years) 0.020 0.019 0.021
[0.014] [0.014] [0.019]
Log of group size -0.151 -0.168 -0.195
[0.187] [0.190] [0.239]
Log of amount granted -0.033
[0.213]
Number of observations 74 68 68 68 59 59 59 59 59 56
R-squared 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.29 0.24
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent confidence level respectively.n
Table 4: Linear regression of the determinants of the demand and supply of loans (groups only)
Dependent variables
Log amount applied for Log amount granted Credit officer made a
Log of interest rate
(per group member) (per group member) pre-loan visit (1:yes,0:no)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Logarithm of distance -0.363*** -0.346*** -0.267* -0.247 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.150*** 0.116*** 0.082**
[0.120] [0.126] [0.142] [0.150] [0.014] [0.015] [0.019] [0.042] [0.023] [0.031]
Female group (1:yes,0:no) -0.537 -0.466 0.176 0.200 0.305*** 0.251**
[0.326] [0.462] [0.176] [0.177] [0.102] [0.108]
Education of head of group (years) 0.031** 0.030* 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.008
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008]
Log of group size -0.818*** -0.836*** -0.829*** -0.849*** -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 -0.141 -0.105** 0.014
[0.165] [0.165] [0.172] [0.177] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.113] [0.046] [0.065]
Log of amount granted 0.020 -0.062
[0.021] [0.038]
Number of observations 58 58 56 56 53 53 50 22 22 21
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.58 0.79 0.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 perceTable 5: Linear regressions of the determinants of loan performance (groups only)
Dependent variables
Loan monitoring by MFI? (1:yes,0:no) Any delayed repayment? (1:yes;0:no) Repayment delay (log of number of days)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Logarithm of distance -0.123*** -0.118*** 0.017 -0.005 -0.047 -0.044 -1.171* -1.172* -1.196* -1.196
[0.042] [0.043] [0.066] [0.065] [0.057] [0.059] [0.650] [0.670] [0.675] [0.697]
Female group (1:yes,0:no) -0.605*** -0.649*** -0.341 -0.414 -0.864*** -0.746*** 4.309* 4.879** -0.454 0.198
[0.105] [0.120] [0.211] [0.246] [0.151] [0.240] [2.160] [2.099] [2.063] [2.117]
Education of head of group (years) 0.015* 0.016* -0.026 -0.026 -0.022 -0.023 -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.145***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.038] [0.039] [0.039] [0.040]
Log of group size 0.139** 0.132** -0.232 -0.217 -0.171 -0.178 -0.401 -0.405 -0.373 -0.377
[0.059] [0.060] [0.162] [0.169] [0.166] [0.179] [1.301] [1.343] [1.348] [1.394]
Loan officer made a pre-loan visit (1:yes,0:no) 0.109 0.458 -0.049 -2.141*** -1.546
[0.243] [0.353] [0.180] [0.684] [1.422]
Regular follow up activities by MFI(1:yes,0:no) -0.700** -0.579 -4.998* -4.747
[0.266] [0.358] [2.566] [2.816]
Number of observations 56 50 34 31 33 30 22 22 22 22
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent confidence level respectively.